| Case 2 | 2:21-cv-00090 Document 42 Filed or | 10/12/21 in TXSD Page 1 of 50age 1 | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|--|--|
| 1 2 3 4 5 | FOR THE SOUTHER HOUSTO MAXIM CRUDE OIL, LLC VERSUS | S CORPUS CHRISTI, TX S THURSDAY, S MAY 20, 2021 | | | |
| 7 | <u>HEARING</u> | | | | |
| 8 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. MORALES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE | | | | |
| 9 | APPEARANCES: | | | | |
| 10 | | | | | |
| 11 | FOR THE PARTIES: | SEE NEXT PAGE | | | |
| 12 | COURT REPORTER: | SHARON RUSSELL | | | |
| 13 | COURT CLERK: | ARLENE RODRIGUEZ | | | |
| 14 | | | | | |
| 15 | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | |
| 19 | | | | | |
| 20 | TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE BY: | | | | |
| 21 | Veritext Legal Solutions 330 Old Country Road, Suite 300 | | | | |
| 22 | Mineola, NY 11501 | | | | |
| 23 | Tel: 800-727-6396 ▼ www.veritext.com | | | | |
| 24 | Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service. | | | | |
| 25 | | | | | |

| Case 2 | 2:21-cv-00090 | Document 42 | Filed on 10/12/21 in TXSD | Page 2 of 50age 2 | |
|--------|-------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| 1 | TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES: | | | | |
| 2 | | | | | |
| 3 | FOR THE PLA | INTIFF: | JODRAN & ORTIZ, Jose A. Ortiz | P.C. | |
| 4 | | | 500 N. Shorelin Suite 900 | e Blvd. | |
| 5 | | | Corpus Christi, 361-884-5678 | TX 78401 | |
| 6 | | | | | |
| 7 | FOR THE DEF | ENDANTS: | BEATTY NAVARRE Michael L. Nava | | |
| 8 | | | 901 S. Mopac Ex Building 1, Sui | pressway | |
| 9 | | | Austin, TX 7874 512-854-5050 | | |
| 10 | | | 312 031 3030 | | |
| 11 | | | | | |
| 12 | | | | | |
| 13 | | | | | |
| 14 | | | | | |
| 15 | | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | |
| 17 | | | | | |
| 18 | | | | | |
| 19 | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | |
| 23 | | | | | |

```
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS; THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2021; 1:07 PM
 1
 2
               CLERK: Court will call Civil Action C21-90, Maxim
 3
     Crude Oil, LLC v. Noil Corp., Inc., et al. May I have
     appearances by counsel.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: For plaintiff.
 6
               MR. ORTIZ: Yes, Your Honor. Antonio Ortiz here for
 7
     the plaintiff, Maxim Crude Oil, LLC. As the Court is very
 8
     aware, we are here on our motion seeking injunctive relief from
 9
     the Court.
10
               THE COURT: Yes. Let's go ahead and get the
     announcements first, and then you can proceed.
11
12
               MR. ORTIZ: Sure.
13
               THE COURT: And for the defense.
14
               MR. NAVARRE: Thank you, Your Honor. Michael
15
     Navarre, Your Honor, for the defendants, Noil Corp., and Steve
16
     Neely.
17
               THE COURT: And Mr. Jensen, who are you representing?
18
               MR. ORTIZ: That's my client, Your Honor.
19
               THE COURT: Okay. And what is your position there?
20
               MR. ORTIZ: My position is attendance in the hearing.
21
               THE COURT: No, no. Mr. Jensen.
22
               MR. ORTIZ: Mr. Jensen is my client.
23
               THE COURT: Oh, very good.
24
               MR. JENSEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I missed that
25
     mute button. I'm sorry. I'm president of Maxim Crude Oil and
```

1 manager/owner. 2 THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. 3 Okay, Mr. Ortiz, you may proceed. MR. ORTIZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 5 As I know that Your Honor has read through all the 6 briefing that has been submitted by the plaintiff and the 7 defendants, you know, we're here seeking an injunction that 8 deals directly with \$600,000 in funds that my client sent over 9 to the defendants; that much is undisputed. They don't dispute 10 that they received those funds. There is a dispute, I understand, as to whether or 11 12 not these funds were escrow funds and whether or not there was 13 an agreement that they would be treated as escrow funds 14 segregated in an escrow account with all of the related legal 15 obligations that come with that. But the fact that the funds 16 were sent is absolutely not in dispute. 17 And so, what we're trying to accomplish here is 18 safequard those funds, is seeking an injunction that deals 19 directly with those funds. 20 And on that note, I would like as just a preliminary 21 issue, perhaps ask the Court that we establish, you know, 22 whether -- and I'm sorry, let me back up. 23 The defendants' response and the defendants' 24 briefings filed with this Court were my client's biggest fear,

and that's the fact that no escrow -- now they're taking the

position that no escrow agreement existed, no escrow account exists, and I don't know exactly what that means. I don't know if that means their position is there's just no legal contractual obligations to maintain the escrow account or if they're saying that there's no account that has these funds at all.

And, you know, when there is a legal obligation to have an escrow agreement in place, you know, I think that's, I think, an issue that is for trial on the merits, but that has nothing to do with my injunction pleadings. No matter what they call the account, you know, I think we'd like to know whether there's an account out there that has my client's money or that can be traced back to the \$600,000 my client sent that is in the defendants' position or control, and I think that they need to tell this Court whether there's a bank account out there that they control that holds that money.

And if they say no, that means they've spent the money and that the relief that the plaintiff is seeking here, it might just be moot and a waste of this Court's, you know, resources and the attorneys' time and clients' money, and I think that's a threshold issue is to what we're trying to accomplish here.

Of course, I'm ready to proceed with my arguments on the merits of the injunction and the elements and why it's necessary here. But I'd like to know, I guess, that, you know,

1 we're here -- we're trying to accomplish something that can be 2 accomplished. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Ortiz, prior to filing this suit or 4 since the filing of the suit, have you attempted to reach an 5 agreement concerning the \$600,000 being put in the registry of 6 the court or being put in a fund pending the outcome of the 7 litigation? 8 MR. ORTIZ: I have, Your Honor. I have asked that 9 the funds be deposited in the registry of the court. I'm not 10 sure if I had that conversation with current defense counsel, but I had that conversation with prior counsel. 11 12 I did ask current defense counsel whether he has confirmed that the funds do exist, you know, whether they are 13 14 in an account. He was not willing to disclose because he 15 believed that to be attorney-client privilege communications 16 and I sort of stopped there. 17 But I have tried to discover the answer to that 18 question, and I have been unsuccessful. 19 THE COURT: So before we get started, Mr. Navarre --20 and is it Navarre or Navarre? 21 MR. NAVARRE: It can go both ways, Your Honor. It's 22 generally speaking the "e" is silent though. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. ORTIZ: That's why I didn't say it.

THE COURT: So there was an injunction from the state

1 court, which I'm sure --2 MR. NAVARRE: That's correct. 3 THE COURT: -- your client complied with, and then it was extended by this Court pending this hearing. What has your 4 5 client done to comply with that order? 6 MR. NAVARRE: Yes, Your Honor. My understanding, 7 Your Honor, is that prior to the TRO being entered into by the 8 state court, some of those funds, my understanding is more than 9 half of those funds, were already disbursed I quess or what 10 have you. When the TRO was entered by the state court, Illinois counsel, who I think Mr. Ortiz was referencing as 11 12 prior counsel, instructed the client not to move any additional 13 funds that were remaining of that \$600,000. 14 When I became involved in the case even before the 15 hearing, I made the same thing. The client has confirmed to me the understanding that there has been no movement, any 16 17 additional movement of any of those \$600,000 in funds. 18 But to answer the Court's question, some of those funds were previously moved before the TRO. 19 20 THE COURT: So concerning the funds that are 21 remaining, let's say roughly \$300,000. 22 MR. NAVARRE: I think it's -- just so I don't mislead 23 the Court, I believe it's about \$160,000, Your Honor, that 24 remains.

THE COURT: So with the remaining funds that are

1 there, is there any -- is there a problem with agreeing to that 2 amount remaining in status quo pending the litigation? 3 I have not discussed that with my MR. NAVARRE: 4 client, Your Honor. My only discussions with opposing counsel 5 had nothing to do with putting money in the registry of the 6 court; they had to do with a settlement to pay the \$600,000. 7 So that's about all I can say, I think, Your Honor. 8 I do think if we go to the argument, Your Honor, I 9 think will go to show that an injunction should not occur in 10 this case. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Well --12 MR. NAVARRE: As a matter of fact, appreciate the 13 Court -- I understand the Court's question. 14 THE COURT: Yes. And so, that by agreement is wholly 15 separate and apart from the injunction. MR. NAVARRE: Yes, sir. 16 17 THE COURT: And I was just wondering if that had been 18 approached. But there's your answer, Mr. Ortiz. There is 19 still some funds that are pending that would be subject to the 20 injunction if all of the elements are met for a preliminary 21 injunction; it's just not the entire amount. 22 So with that, let me let you know, Mr. Ortiz, the 23 issue that's causing the Court the most concern is the 24 likelihood of irreparable harm and why damages would not be a

suitable legal remedy for your client. Obviously, we've got

1 breach of contact claims going both ways.

My understanding is that the amount at issue in the first contract or in the contract was something north of 2 million, something like \$2.4 million, of which 2 million was paid, 1.6 returned — or 1.4 returned with 600,000 being what we're discussing today. So I'm not sure if the additional \$400,000 is still something the defendants would seek to recover as far as damages, or if the damages are just the sole amount here.

But we've got these breach claims that are going both ways. And at the end of the day, even if the \$600,000 was there, it seems to the Court that there would be an adequate remedy at law and whatever is owed to Maxim would be able to be recovered pursuant to monetary damages.

So if you could put the Court's mind at ease about that, that is what's causing me the most concern with entering a preliminary injunction.

MR. ORTIZ: Your Honor, well, with respect to what they claim to be a breach, I'll establish here -- and I've got a PowerPoint that I'd want to walk you through -- the agreement for the escrow and, you know, the evidence, all of which is in writing.

I've never had a case that has so much in writing that deals with fraud because usually that's a lot harder to prove. I like to say fraud is rarely committed in the light of

day, but I believe here, you'll find the opposite to be true.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ortiz, just concerning breach just so you know, the Court is likely to find that you have a likelihood of success. I'm just going to assume that. It's this last part that's causing me concern.

MR. ORTIZ: Sure. Well, I guess to get into that issue, I'd have to get into the history of the defendants, and that's Mr. Neely himself and this Noil Corp., Inc. And that, for me to do that, I'd have to tell you first about Noil Petroleum, Inc, and that was a previous entity owned by Mr. Neely that — there's a series of litigation that's been filed against Noil Petroleum Corp. that involves a lot of the same sort of allegations that we have here where people have paid for fuel for it to be delivered and no fuel shows up.

Noil -- and that has resulted in lawsuits by Marathon Petroleum, Potent Petroleum, L. Energy International, and Genesis Marine, all against Noil Petroleum. Marathon was awarded a judgment in excess of a million dollars, and I think at least a couple of others were awarded judgments in excess of \$7 million. It's my understanding that none of them have ever collected a dollar on those judgments.

Now, Noil Petroleum Corp. was involuntarily dissolved in September 2020, where Mr. Neely just started doing business under Noil Corp. It's the identical website. It's all the identical business activities. It's just a new shell entity

conducting the same short of shame operations. Mr. Neely
himself has filed bankruptcy five times in two different
states, with the most recent bankruptcy being in Illinois. I
believe the case was closed in November of 2019. So we have
defendants here who have a history of misappropriating funds,
of converting funds.

L. Energy International in their lawsuit alleged th

L. Energy International in their lawsuit alleged that Mr. Neely was running a Ponzi scheme through Noil Petroleum Corp. And so what has he done? He's just shut down Noil Petroleum Corp. and started doing business under Noil Corp. with the identical website that it's obvious in certain portions he just deletes the actual word Petroleum in the name of the entity.

The video that he uses on his website, it's the same video he used for Noil Petroleum Corp. where he advertises, you know, he markets himself to, well, the entire country, claims to be one of the nation's leading fuel provider. Actually claims to be fueling the nation — that is their tag line — and claims to have defense contracts, all of which there's no evidence to be true.

There's just substantial evidence there that he's mishandled/misappropriated funds, and the funds at issue here, you just heard Mr. Navarre say that he's already spent some of the money. So the only reason that there's -- whether there's 160 or 120, the only reason there's \$160,000 left is because he

```
1
     was told by his lawyers not to spend it when we have an
 2
     agreement in place that will show that there was -- it could
 3
     not have been more crystal clear that the agreement was that he
     was not -- that the funds were not to be removed from the
 4
 5
     account until plaintiff had received its product. Plaintiff
 6
     never received its product.
 7
               THE COURT: Was that in the -- Mr. Ortiz, was that
 8
     memorialized in the written contract?
 9
               MR. ORTIZ: It was -- yes, it's memorialized in the
10
     invoice sent with the contract, and the invoice says, "To be
     held in the trade account, not to be disbursed until product
11
12
     has been confirmed as lifted." And then there's a message, an
13
     email, where they say that their trade account, which is
14
     referenced on the invoice, actually means their escrow account.
15
     And I could show you that right now if you'd like me to
16
     screenshot it.
17
               THE COURT: I've reviewed that, so please proceed.
18
               MR. ORTIZ: Okay. So there, I mean, that's as
     explicit as you could possibly be. But also, the agreement
19
20
     itself, you know, the actual, you know, approved products
21
     agreement says that the payment terms -- well, it says, "Jobber
22
     shall, except at Noil's option, pay Noil cash before delivery
23
     or pickup." However, there's a section that says, "Change of
24
     payment terms," and it says, "Terms of payment are subject to
```

change based on agreement written with jobber."

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

access to a month later.

Well, I will show you at least 12 different written correspondence where they acknowledge the agreement that there would be an escrow structure. They refer to the funds as escrow funds. They refer to the account as an escrow account. They ask about the status of the remaining escrow funds. mean, you know -- I have it in one slide up -- and these representations were made before the contract was entered into, the day the contract was entered into, after the contract was entered into. And even after I got involved, Mr. Neely was telling my client that his lawyer would send a screenshot of the escrow account that shows all of the funds are there in place and have not been touched. So there was an agreement to have those funds be treated as escrow funds, be placed in an escrow account, and to not be touched until the product has been confirmed by plaintiff as being lifted. No product was ever delivered. Also, the price that they used for the product is dated March 15th. Well, as of April 15th, their lawyer confirmed that they still hadn't secured any product, but the price is supposed to be that price and, in fact, at the time of delivery. So there's no way they could even come up with the

THE COURT: $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) ^{2}$ And when did they have access to the

price on March 15th for a product that they still hadn't had

1 product that supposedly you declined, or your client declined?

2 MR. ORTIZ: They claim my client declined the 3 product, but it was after they were unable to supply it for two

4 or three weeks. And my client had told them that he had

5 purchasers that -- timely preparing this product was very

6 necessary and they said that the product was there so that my

7 client would wire the funds.

And then it became excuse after excuse as to why they couldn't get codes necessary to lift the product at the terminal and then my client would demand to be paid back. My client even offered to provide a letter of credit from JPMorgan Chase Bank if they would return the \$2 million; that way, he knew at least his money was being safeguarded during this time they were trying to secure the product.

All the excuses that they came up for over a month is what led my client -- my client eventually found an alternate source for this because he had -- you know, they had \$2 million of his operating capital tied up for a month, which is huge, you know, for my client and he's not a huge company. Two million dollars is a massive amount of money for him; of course, it's even more than enough money when I consider it.

But that left him without operating capital. He was having to actually get -- factor some of his invoices at extremely high interest rates and he had no choice. They never received confirmation that they actually have the product ever.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Okay. So the Circuit tells me that I can only find irreparable harm where there's no adequate remedy at law, such as monetary damages. So explain to me why monetary damages wouldn't solve all of those issues if you were to prevail on the merits. MR. ORTIZ: Well, Your Honor, there's case law that says there's title to the property of the funds are in dispute, the proper remedy is to place those funds in the registry of the court. Also, there is other case law that says that the likelihood that -- I'm sorry -- the unlikelihood or the speculative nature in which you'd be able to collect monetary damages from a defendant is also a factor that we can consider in granting injunctive relief. And here, we have a defendant that -- if no injunctive relief is granted and they are no longer under the TRO that's currently in place, those funds will be gone. Mr. Neely will file bankruptcy again. There's simply -- I have no confidence at all, and I think the evidence proves, his history proves that there'd (indiscernible) ever be recovered. THE COURT: So the evidence that the Court's going to find on if the Court were to find in your favor is the Law 360 article that you introduced, the memorandum and order from Northern District of Ohio, as well as the bankruptcies, correct?

MR. ORTIZ: Yes. I would like to offer, you know,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

being made in this case whatsoever.

the lawsuits or I guess the order of judgment for Marathon Petroleum and also, the dissolution of Noil Petroleum Corp. and the fact that Noil Corp. was then created a year after the Marathon litigation was instituted. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Navarre. Thank you, Your Honor. Let's start MR. NAVARRE: with that if you don't mind. Yes, there's a Law 360 article about a recently filed L. Energy case in Harris County. There's no judgment in that case, Your Honor. There's been no discovery in that case; nothing has occurred in that case. Counsel previously talked about civil judgments against Noil Petroleum Corp. No judgment in that case. And in that case, as Mr. Neely is quoted in the article, he explains that what happened was the person went behind his back to get the customer, then that customer didn't pay, so that doesn't prove anything. It doesn't prove failure to pay, et cetera. The Marathon case, Your Honor, went up on appeal. I believe it just came back on appeal, and it's now in the proceedings as far as judgment. That case is not like this case at all. In that case, the disputes, and the Court will see from looking at the opinion, the dispute was who -- was where the destination was going to be as far as the slurry in the case. It has nothing to do with the allegations that are

Counsel mentioned two other cases that he says

- there's judgments on. It's not in the record, Your Honor. Ι'm not aware of those. Had those been brought up in the briefing, I would have been more than happy to respond to it, but that's obviously no evidence. Now, as far as Noil Corp. versus Noil Petroleum Corp., we cited in our response, Your Honor, the case of the --I quess it turned out to be Russian fraudsters who were using the name Noil for a tax evasion scheme. And what we submitted to the Court, Your Honor, was from Lexis, the recent opinion convicting those people of fraud. The Court will notice that Mr. Neely and Noil Corp.
 - The Court will notice that Mr. Neely and Noil Corp. and Miss Jennifer Watson, who is the person dealing mostly with Maxim, none of them were there. That's why the name -- that's why we now are Noil Corp. is because of that fraud and the repercussions of that. Had nothing to do with Mr. Neely, Mr. Neely was not a defendant, et cetera.

As far as Mr. Neely's personal bankruptcies, those were discharged, et cetera, and they don't show anything. And frankly, Your Honor, to show that there's no adequate remedy at law with respect to Mr. Neely, they have to get past the -- you know, being successful on the case, the likelihood of success. And with respect to Mr. Neely, there's just nothing there; there's not even factual allegations in the petition.

And as the Court is aware, we did file the motion to dismiss, as we had promised to do so, on the basis of

```
1
     jurisdiction, so before we can even get to the --
 2
               THE COURT: When was that filed, Mr. Navarre?
 3
               MR. NAVARRE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: When was that filed?
 4
 5
               MR. NAVARRE: Oh, shoot. I believe that was filed
 6
     maybe --
 7
               MR. ORTIZ: A week ago.
 8
               MR. NAVARRE: Yeah, a week ago. It was filed a day
 9
     early actually, Your Honor, which meant I got to sleep that
10
     night, along with our -- then we also filed an Answer in the
     case obviously. So that puts Mr. Neely aside.
11
12
               With respect to Noil Corp., if the claim is because
13
     the corporation is closed down, that means that there's no
14
     adequate remedy of law because the prior corporation was closed
15
     down. Well, Your Honor, that's frankly why we cited the case
16
     where Mr. Jensen was personally sued, along with two of the
17
     companies that look like they're no longer doing business with
18
     Mr. Jensen, and the claims about stolen gas by Mexican cartels
     being resold by Mr. Jensen and many other companies. And those
19
20
     two companies, Big Star Gathering and St. James, I think, at
     least based upon searching through the records, those companies
21
22
     have been closed down.
23
               So that kind of swings both ways, if you will, Your
24
     Honor, where frankly, no evidence as far as no adequate remedy
```

of law. We cited in our briefing the court cases that

1 establish that monetary damages is adequate as a matter of law.

The exception that counsel is trying to argue is not supported

3 by the evidence here.

But, Your Honor, I would like to address the question of the success on the merits, the likelihood of success, which they bear the burden of with this extraordinary remedy. And in this case, Your Honor, it is undisputed, undisputed that Maxim breached the contract.

The invoice that counsel referred to had a payment due date of March 16th in the amount of \$2.8 million. Even the evidence offered by Maxim shows that they didn't pay anything before that due date; they paid \$2 million on March 22nd and March 26th combined. They've never paid the full amount, Your Honor.

We have an email that we attach as Exhibit 4 of Mr. Jensen on March 18th, so this is two days after the deadline for payment that was required by the contract and by the invoice, both of which Mr. Jensen signed on behalf of his company, Maxim.

In that email, he said that, "I've had to move some additional funds out of money market type of account, which has taken a few days longer than I anticipated transfer over."

That was his excuse for not having to pay the full amount yet.

He then stated, "I think we should have everything straightened out by tomorrow." Tomorrow would have been March 19th. Money

market funds, Your Honor, can be moved rather quickly. But more importantly, contrary to his promise to have everything straightened by tomorrow, the \$2.8 million was never paid.

And we cited black letter case law, a longstanding

Texas case law, that you cannot enforce a provision of a

contract when you have breached that same contract. You can't

pick one provision and enforce it while breaching the other

provisions.

And really, Your Honor, what they're seeking here is specific performance of a contract that they breached of a term that does not exist. I will assure the Court I have looked through the crude services agreement several times, both with my eyes and also using (indiscernible) pdf, the find function, to see if the word escrow was in there. The word escrow is nowhere in there.

Yes, there are communications between Miss Watson, who -- and they submitted an affidavit from her. She's not a lawyer, she didn't go to law school. She did use the word escrow before the contract, Your Honor, and even after the contract, Your Honor, but there's no escrow agreement.

In an escrow agreement, you have a third party that holds the escrow, you have a purpose for the escrow that's set forth, you have conditions as far as how the money is going to be held and by who. You also have conditions as far as how the money is going to be disbursed when the escrow agreement

terminates or on other conditions. That does not exist, Your Honor.

And importantly, in this case, the contract itself, Your Honor, states, and this is in Section 21 in its interbriefing. Contract states that the crude products agreement, "Terminates and supersedes any prior agreements between Maxim and Noil." This is the agreement, that's it, no more.

And, Your Honor, counsel tried to say, well, we've got emails showing an agreement that could be an escrow agreement. That doesn't do the trick, Your Honor, because in the contract itself, as you'll see in most contracts between sophisticated parties like these parties, the contract again in Section 20 states that any modification or waiver to contract must be, "in writing and signed by Noil Corp., Inc."

There is no modification of the contract, there is no waiver of any of the terms of the contract that was signed by and agreed to by Noil. The only other contract or agreement is the invoice, Your Honor, and that just takes away the whole breach of contract claim that they have because there's no escrow.

But even more importantly, Your Honor, because I heard counsel referencing more the fraud, Your Honor, they did not even set forth in their briefing the elements of fraud and trying to prove that they can prove the elements of fraud. One of the elements of fraud, as the Court is aware, is reliance.

But it's not just reliance, Your Honor, it is justifiable reliance, justifiable reliance. And the Texas Supreme Court consistently, especially in the last couple of years, has stated that as a matter of law, justifiable reliance is negated by the terms of a written contract.

And, Your Honor, I'd like to cite a couple of cases for the Court on that proposition. Number one is the Barrow-Shaver case, it is at 590 S.W. 3d 471; it's a Texas Supreme Court case in 2019. In that case, Your Honor, the contractual provision stated — and I apologize if I was talking too quickly for the court reporter — "The rights provided to Barrow-Shaver under this letter agreement may not be assigned, subleased, or otherwise transferred in whole or in part without the express written consent of Carrizo." That was the contractual provision, Your Honor.

Well, there was evidence, undisputed evidence that in the negotiations, representations were made that the assignment wouldn't be a problem, "It won't be a problem," "Don't worry about it. We will work with you. We will promise you the consent and it won't be a problem." So all of those statements remain, okay, before the contract as representations, and those were deemed to be alleged misrepresentations.

But the Court said written agreements, as well as oral agreements, serve a purpose under the law; they provide binding terms for the parties. "In this case, we recognize

that Laufer's oral representations and the consent to sign provision also do not involve precisely the same language." In other words, it doesn't have to be in the contract, you know, the light is red, and then the representation is the light is green.

If it's on the same subject matter and it conflicts, the written contract governs, and you cannot justifiably rely on representations that are contrary to what you agreed to in writing and that were signed and executed by Maxim by Mr.

Jensen. The Court held that Barrow-Shaver could not justifiably rely on statements that purported to change the parties' written agreement.

And, in fact, Your Honor, that is in line with the other Texas Supreme Court authority, I would cite, to JPMorgan Chase Bank case versus Orca, and that's at 546 S.W. 3d 648, another Texas Supreme Court case in 2018.

And in that case, the Court states, relying -- I think quoting to another case, "As Texas Courts have repeatedly held, a party to a written contract cannot justifiably rely on oral misrepresentations regarding the contract's unambiguous terms." The Court went on to express the public policy in Texas with respect to freedom of contract and to have value put into written contracts. "It is to provide greater certainty regarding what the terms of the transactions are and that those terms would be binding, thereby lessening the potential for

1 error, misfortune, and dispute."

So, Your Honor, with respect to the substantial likelihood of success, they don't have a substantial likelihood of success. They cannot enforce a contract: number one, that doesn't have the escrow agreement provision that they would like it to have; number two, they cannot enforce it because they breached the contract and, frankly, Your Honor, they breached the contract first. The contract was breached on March 16th where they didn't pay the full amount. The contract continues to be in breach because they never did pay the \$2.8 million.

And, Your Honor, if they go to the fraud misrepresentation, they have not provided evidence that they justifiably relied on it, and they can't because under clear and consistent Texas Supreme Court authority, they cannot justifiably rely on alleged oral, or in this case email or text, representations that are contrary to what they subsequently executed, so there's no substantial likelihood of success.

And, Your Honor, I can go into the other two requirements for injunctive relief, but frankly, Your Honor, I think those are two barriers that they cannot pass, and I appreciate the Court letting me go back. And, frankly, Your Honor, I appreciate the Court referencing the Court's initial thoughts on a substantial likelihood of success so that I could

```
1
     address that; that is why we have, you know, hearings.
 2
               THE COURT: Exactly, and I wasn't saying that the
 3
     issue was foreclosed. I was saying that I wanted to
     concentrate on one particular one, assuming the other.
 4
 5
               Let me ask you before I go back to Mr. Ortiz, one of
 6
     the elements is balance is hardships.
 7
               MR. NAVARRE: Yes, Your Honor.
 8
               THE COURT: What hardship would it create for your
 9
     client to have the remaining $160,000 remain as status quo
10
     pending the litigation?
11
               MR. NAVARRE: Yeah. I think it's the same hardship
12
     on both companies frankly, Your Honor, and that is just having
13
     working capital, which I don't see that as a factor that goes -
14
     - or is a requirement that goes either way.
15
               THE COURT: Okay.
               MR. NAVARRE: And that is being as candid as I can
16
17
     be.
18
               THE COURT: I understand. I appreciate that.
19
               Mr. Ortiz, response.
20
               MR. ORTIZ: Yes, Your Honor. Great arguments there,
21
     except nothing here contradicts the terms of the agreement.
22
               If I may screenshare?
23
               THE COURT: Yes, please.
24
               MR. ORTIZ: It says it's disabled.
25
               THE COURT: Let's see if there's something I can do.
```

```
1
               MR. ORTIZ: I think if you click on participants,
 2
     there'll be an option for you to allow me to screenshare.
 3
               CLERK: Okay. He should be able to share.
               THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ortiz, you want to give it a
 4
 5
     try?
 6
               MR. ORTIZ: Thank you, Your Honor. Well, as you can
 7
     see here, the payment terms on the contract say that they're
 8
     subject to change based on agreement with (sound glitch). It
 9
     doesn't mean that it has to be a written, signed agreement.
10
     But no matter the case, you will see that before the agreement
     is even entered into -- I'm sorry, got the wrong slide here.
11
12
     Oh, there we are. I'm sorry.
13
               You'll see that before the agreement is even entered
14
     into, Noil, through its representative Jennifer Watson,
15
     expressly states, "I can guarantee to have the contract today.
16
     It includes the escrow structure." And above, you'll see that
17
     it's crucial to Maxim that it has that escrow arrangement
18
     because it wants to save for those funds.
               So then the agreement itself. Well, payment terms
19
20
     says shall pay Noil in cash before delivery or pickup. We did
21
     send the funds before delivery or pickup. Then there's Section
22
     6(c), which says, "The terms of payment are subject to change
23
     based on agreement written with (indiscernible)."
24
               Well, we got no less than a dozen different
25
     representations where they acknowledged the agreement is having
```

an escrow account. Not only that, but we have the invoice which is sent with the contract, and it says, "Payment is to be held by Noil Corp., Inc. trade account until the first lift has been confirmed as completed." Now, no lift was ever made and there was never — no lift was ever confirmed as completed. We know that they had \$2 million in their possession, and they were never able to produce the product we were trying to purchase.

So the money was supposed to be held in that trade account which, you know, normally if you have an escrow agreement when it says something about a trade account and not an escrow account, you know, red flags go off. But here's how they diffused that with these fraudulent representations where Miss Watson says the escrow listed on the invoice — oh sorry — the escrow is listed on the invoice as trade account escrow, not to be released until completed lift, date of first lift."

Now, there was no date of first lift because the product was never delivered. She's clearly -- she's supplementing the contract terms. She's actually defining what a trade account is by saying trade account actually means an escrow account.

And I think it's very important, it might be a subtle point, but it's crucial that the Court is aware that this contract is the defendants' contract that was provided to the plaintiff. Plaintiff did not have counsel draft their contract

or make redline changes or anything. This is 100 percent a version of defendants' contract that they prepared.

Now, even after, you know, this trade account issue, the invoice is sent. Again, Miss Watson refers to the funds as funds for the escrow trade account, just to keep the ruse going, to continue this fraud where they let the plaintiff believe that his funds are being sent to an escrow account where they will be safeguarded and will not be touched until he received the product.

And as to Mr. Navarre's claim that, well, we breached the contract because when we paid 2 million and the invoice had, I think, it was 2.3 something million. Well, here's the conversations between Miss Watson and the plaintiff where she says we are — because the wires had to be sent in two separate wires, 1.5 million and then 500,000. And she says, "We're good to go. When will the other 500,000 be available? That is all we need." And then again, she says, "Once the other 500 comes in over the day or two, then we will be good to lift the full load."

So it's clear there she's representing, hey, just give us another 500,000, once you get to 2 million and you're good to go. Of course, the justifiable reliance on those representations is shown right here in Maxim's wire confirmations of \$2 million.

Even afterwards, here, April 2nd, well after the

desk now."

contract was entered into, we have Miss Watson saying: "Your agreed escrow amount was not received until late last Friday.

That was when the schedule was to be released. The refinery is the one who had not performed and caused issues. But as of today, Steve -- referring to Neely -- will send you what you need to lift. He's waiting on a final call from the scheduling

And these excuses just kept on and on and on until my client said, please give me my money back; I'm very concerned about these funds and said I'll provide a \$2 million letter of credit once you give me those \$2 million in funds back, because he's very concerned about their whereabouts and what they're doing with those funds. And the excuses as the time goes on, they just get more and more ludicrous.

And they say, oh, we have the product, and he says, okay, great, I'll send trucks over to pick it up. And they say, well, we kind of have it, we just need some codes, and once we get those codes, we'll have it for real. And he's saying, well, what do you mean; do you have it, or do you not have it? And then they say, we should have it by tomorrow.

And this continues for two weeks. Ultimately, he sends his termination letter on, I believe, it's April 6th, and the contract allows that -- says that the jobber can terminate with seven days' notice, which he provided. We did not hear from their attorney until April 15. And in that letter, the

```
1
     attorney said would you like my client to cease seeking to
 2
     procure that product, meaning as of April 15, they still had
 3
     not secured that product.
 4
               It's my belief that -- it's my client's belief that
 5
     they never intended to secure that product at all. This was
 6
     just -- it was all about getting the funds. I don't know what
 7
     they did with them. I don't know how they spent, you know,
 8
     $440,000 of it already, but they did. And they claim to be
 9
     entitled to lost profits on the sale of product it never had to
10
     purchase. I just can't wrap my head around that and, you know,
11
     I hope it's not just me.
12
               THE COURT: When was the contract without the escrow
13
     language signed?
14
               MR. ORTIZ: March 16th. What do you mean without the
15
     escrow language?
               THE COURT: Well, the contract. When was the
16
17
     contract signed?
18
               MR. ORTIZ: The crude products agreement was signed
19
     March 16th, which is the same date that the invoice was sent
20
     that has the trade account language.
21
               THE COURT: Sure.
22
               MR. ORTIZ: It was actually sent in the same email.
23
               THE COURT: So in those texts, the vice president was
24
     saying we're going to send you a contract with the escrow
25
     language in it; that was never done?
```

1 MR. ORTIZ: They sent the contract with the invoice 2 that has the trade account language in it, and then she 3 explained that trade account means escrow account. THE COURT: Okay. So the contract itself didn't, but 4 the language that you're referencing is in an attachment. Was 5 6 it an exhibit to the contract, the invoice? 7 MR. ORTIZ: Well, so the crude products agreement is 8 sort of a master services agreement that sort of covers the 9 relationship with the parties. But then the individual 10 purchases of crude that would have the amount, you know, the 11 volume being purchased, the price for that particular volume, 12 and then that's where the trade -- you know, the trade account 13 language is contained. And you know, an invoice is, under 14 Texas law, considered a contract. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ortiz, other than what you've 16 submitted to the Court, do you have any other testimony 17 evidence or anything that you wish to present to the Court? 18 MR. ORTIZ: I have a whole bunch of text messages 19 referencing the escrow funds and referencing their agreement 20 for there to be escrowed, and I'd be happy to take you through 21 that. 22 THE COURT: But these are all text messages that are 23 included in your briefing, correct? 24 MR. ORTIZ: The only text messages that were not 25 included in my briefing are the ones that I just showed you

1 where they acknowledge the \$2 million is enough, you know, 2 we're not saying you breached any contract by not providing the 2.3. And that's because the issue was raised for the very 3 4 first time in their briefing I think that we received yesterday 5 or maybe the day before yesterday because it's (sound glitch) 6 that we breached the contract because only 2 million was there 7 (sound glitch). So that's why I secured those text messages and that was not in my brief. I had not anticipated that 8 9 argument. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Those will be in the record and the Court will consider those as part of the record as well. 11 12 Any reply, Mr. Navarre? 13 MR. NAVARRE: Yes, Your Honor. 14 Let's start with those messages and getting the 15 product (sound glitch) that he doesn't think we ever tried to 16 get the product or ever intended to. There's no evidence of 17 that, Your Honor. On the contrary, Miss Watson's affidavit 18 shows the opposite. The text messages show they were trying to 19 arrange pricing terms, et cetera. 20 They also show that we thought we were going to get 21 the product from the Valero, which is where Maxim had wanted us 22 to get the product from. And they also show, Your Honor -- Mr. 23 Jensen's shaking his head there -- but we also have an email or 24 a text message in the record -- this is part of what Maxim

submitted -- on April 7th and it's at Page 39 of this

1 | submission. It's a text message, and I believe it's from Mr.

2 Jensen where he says, "David has convinced me that we should

3 wait another day based on his conversation with Valero."

So remember the agreement was signed about March 15th/March 16th. By April 7th, both parties were trying their best to get product from Valero.

The problem, Your Honor, that we experienced and the problem that everybody experienced is that Valero had told us that they had the product for us. They had made a commitment to us, which we passed on to Maxim. However, we then found out subsequently that Valero was shutting down that Three Rivers terminal. And there's a text message frankly from Maxim that's also that there would never be product from that Three Rivers terminal and, therefore, we couldn't get it.

But at least on April 7th -- so this is, what, about three weeks after the contract was signed -- David, who I believe is David Hillman is his name, who works at Maxim was having phone calls with Valero where Valero was telling them, hey, we can get product, we can still do it. So as of April 7th, everybody still thought we were going to get product from Valero. We always intended to do that.

And, Your Honor, even after we were starting to be threatened by Maxim, our people have continued to try to get product, and this goes back to the Court's prior question, and was able to obtain offers from other companies for product, but

those companies were turned down. But we also submitted evidence, Your Honor, in the record that at least one company decided not to do business with Maxim based upon their due diligence of Maxim and its history.

So we have tried to get product. We continue to try to get product even after things broke down, even after we were threatened. This is not a shell company; there's no proof of that. In fact, Miss Watson's affidavit disproves that.

However, Your Honor, I also want to go back to the claim about the \$2 million being sufficient. There was never any amendment to this contract that they'd only have to pay 2 million. It was \$2.8 million in the beginning, Your Honor.

The text messages that counsel showed don't change that.

In fact, we were being pressured by Maxim to start our work prior to getting any of the money, and we did, Your Honor. We started trying to get product even before the contract was signed. That's all that were good to go. We were trying to get the product before we got a dollar in. We continued to try to get the product when we only had 1.5 in, when we had 2 million in, and even after that point in time, Your Honor.

And by the way, when that text message was sent, I believe that was before the text message where Mr. Jensen had promised to us, "I think we should have everything straightened out by tomorrow," as far as the payment of the \$2.8 million.

1 So we would also rely on Mr. Jensen and Maxim to comply with 2 their obligations of the contract, which they never did. 3 Well, let me go back to the contract, and I'm going to try to show the Court my screen. Does that work? 4 5 THE COURT: It does. MR. NAVARRE: Okay, great. My 13-year-old son will 6 7 be proud of me for showing me how to do that. 8 This is the contract, Your Honor. This is Section 21 9 of the contract. And I've hopefully highlighted two of the 10 sentences in this prior agreement provision, "Subject to the foregoing, effective as of the commencement of the term hereof, 11 12 this agreement terminates and supersedes any prior agreements 13 between jobber, which is Maxim, and Noil Corp., Inc. and its 14 affiliates relating to the subject matter hereof." 15 And then, Your Honor, the last sentence, "No 16 modification of this agreement and no waiver of any provision 17 hereof shall be binding on Noil Corp., Inc. unless in writing 18 and signed by Noil Corp., Inc." 19 So when counsel said that there was no requirement 20 that things be in writing or be signed by Noil, that's directly 21 contrary to the contract, Your Honor. The text messages back 22 and forth with Miss Watson talks about an escrow, which she 23 mistakenly thinks escrow is the same as what's in the invoice

as far as trade account. That's not an escrow agreement, Your

24

25

Honor.

```
1
               There was no escrow agreement in the contract.
 2
     word escrow, as I went through with the Court before, is not in
     the contract. It's not in the invoice, Your Honor. And
 3
     there's no proof that any of the money was removed from the
 4
 5
     trade account prior to the breaches and the subsequent downfall
 6
     in the parties' relationship. So there's no evidence of a
 7
     breach as far as the trade account, Your Honor, prior to the
 8
     breaches made by Maxim.
 9
               So that goes back to the substantial likelihood.
10
     There is no contractual term for escrow agreement; therefore,
     there can be no breach of contract, Your Honor. There was no -
11
12
     - there is, in fact, a written contract for what's going to
13
     happen to the money and it's not to go into escrow, it's
14
     something different; therefore, there could be no justifiable
15
     reliance on that, so there can be no justifiable reliance, Your
16
     Honor.
17
               THE COURT: What does the contract say is going to
18
     happen to the funds?
19
               MR. NAVARRE: It'll be in the trade account, Your
20
     Honor.
21
               THE COURT: And the trade account, according to the
22
     invoice, says they're going to be held until the product is
23
     lifted.
24
               MR. NAVARRE: That's correct, Your Honor, that's
25
               And by the time we got to that point in time, the
     correct.
```

- 1 contract had already been breached. And there is black letter 2 law in Texas that says that you cannot enforce a contract that 3 you have breached, and there's no doubt that the first breach here was by Maxim. It's undisputed, Your Honor, that the first 4 5 breach was by them. 6 And of course, by that point in time, we were far 7 down the line as far as our efforts to try to procure the 8 product with brokers and having to pay and having resources. 9 And on the other part of the likelihood of success on 10 the fraud, Your Honor, the Texas Supreme Court cases are straight on point. They can't win on that claim. They 11 12 certainly can't show the likelihood of success that's required 13 for this extraordinary remedy. And that's separate and apart, 14 Your Honor, from the issue that the Court first raised as far 15 as adequate remedy of law. So unless the Court has any questions, we would ask 16
 - that the Court deny the motion for preliminary injunction.
- 18 MR. ORTIZ: If I may make a couple of quick points, Your Honor. 19

20

21

22

23

24

- THE COURT: Of course. And, Mr. Ortiz, if you could address which breach was first, as the defendant is saying that it's undisputed that Maxim breached first.
- MR. ORTIZ: I have no idea what he's talking about that was a breach. No one had ever mentioned to my client that there was a breach at all. My client wired \$2 million.

```
If he is saying that there was a breach because only
 1
 2
     $2 million was wired, I would like to point Mr. Navarre to
 3
     this.
               MR. NAVARRE: Your Honor, I can clarify if the Court
 4
 5
     would like.
 6
               MR. ORTIZ: To this provision.
 7
               THE COURT: I'll let Mr. Ortiz --
 8
               MR. ORTIZ: Am I screen sharing?
 9
               THE COURT: Yes, you are.
10
               MR. ORTIZ: So the prices -- the price terms on the
11
     contract say that they were the prices to jobber in effect at
12
     the time and place of each delivery for the particular product.
     So I don't know how the invoice for, you know, 2.8 million or
13
14
     whatever it was, could even dictate the price for a product
15
     that they took -- that at least a month went by, and they still
     hadn't been able to procure it.
16
17
               Also, the money was only wired because they had
18
     represented that they have the product. They represented they
19
     had the product. They said we're ready, we've got it for you
20
     at the terminal, send us the money. That's when my client
21
     started working to get those funds wired. And then once they
22
     got wired, he realized that they don't have the product, so
23
     it's really misconstruing the facts as they played out.
24
               But they said they had the product. We then, because
```

they had the product, they took the price in effect at the

time, I guess, and then they created an invoice and that's how they calculated the dollar figure on that invoice. Sent us the invoice, which required payment I think on the day that it was sent, which would have been impossible, you know, to send the wire that quick basically at the time it was sent, and we got our funds together as quickly as we could. We sent them \$2 million. They were unable to provide the product for at least a month and we don't know that they'd ever been able to source the product.

And again, as to his arguments that we can't -- that the contract requires that in order for it to be -- the terms to be altered, it needs to be in writing and signed by both parties. Well, nothing about the escrow structure that is discussed at length and agreed to clearly by the parties is contradictory to any of the terms of the contract. It simply supplements and clarifies certain terms of the contract.

I mean, the payment terms on the contract are extremely vague. For example, it says, "Jobber shall, except at Noil's option, pay Noil cash before delivery or pickup for crude products purchased hereunder." Well, the jobber, which is my client Maxim, did pay them \$2 million in cash before delivery or pickup of the crude.

Also, it says, "Change of payment terms. The terms of payment are subject to change based on agreement written with jobber," where we clearly have extensive agreement written

1 where we talk about the escrow structure. But the point is 2 that the escrow structure, the escrow agreement, none of that 3 contradicts the terms of this contract as it's written. 4 Also, the invoice, the trade account; that's all 5 consistent with our escrow agreement and the escrow structure. 6 So I don't know how he can say that the provision on the 7 invoice regarding the trade account and the funds not to be 8 disbursed from there until product is confirmed as delivered, 9 how that is not contradictory to the crude products agreement. 10 But an escrow agreement or structure would be contradictory to the terms of the agreement because they're 11 12 essentially the same thing if you respect the provisions as 13 they're worded. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Ortiz, could I see the invoice again? 15 MR. ORTIZ: Absolutely. 16 THE COURT: So it looks like the invoice was for how 17 much, 2.3? 18 MR. ORTIZ: \$2,329,897.50. 19 THE COURT: And so, the amendment that you -- you're 20 saying the working amendment is the text back and forth that 2 21 million will suffice, as opposed to the 2.3. 22 The \$2 million would allow them to MR. ORTIZ: Yes. 23 get the product. In that same text message, they say that, 24 well, you know, I could talk to Steve about just reducing the

amount of volume that we give you based upon the \$1.5 million

1 figure that they had already received. But if we wait and get 2 the other 500,000, we'll give you all of the volume that this 3 represented in this invoice. THE COURT: So it's not 2.3 because the price allowed 4 5 the entire amount for 2 million even, correct, or no? 6 MR. ORTIZ: I think the agreement was that we will 7 allow you to start lifting the product at the terminal so long 8 as we have the \$2 million, because they knew that, at that 9 point, just getting the balance of \$329,000 would be guick as 10 soon as he had received that product or had gotten access to to lift the initial volume there that's listed on the invoice. 11 12 THE COURT: So there was still additional volume 13 beyond the 2 million that was left under the contract, correct, 14 that was still --15 MR. ORTIZ: Well, the contract provides for I think 16 it was 6.5 million gallons a month for up to a year; that's why 17 it was sort of like an MSA or a master services agreement. The 18 crude products agreement called for -- it may have been 50 19 million gallons in the entire year unless it's terminated by 20 one of the parties prior. 21 THE COURT: And what amount of volume did the \$2 22 million account for? 23 MR. ORTIZ: Oh, that accounts for 1.5 million 24 gallons.

THE COURT: Okay. So on that point about first in

- 1 time breach, Mr. Navarre, you wanted to respond.
- 2 MR. NAVARRE: Yes, Your Honor, if I can show my
- 3 screen if you don't mind.
- THE COURT: Yes, please. And Mr. Ortiz, you'll have
- 5 the last word since it's your motion.
- 6 MR. NAVARRE: So here's the invoice, Your Honor, that
- 7 the Court was asking about. This shows the payment due date, I
- 8 highlighted here, is March 16 of 2021.
- 9 Contrary to counsel's suggestion or going through
- 10 that it had to be wired that day because down here, it says
- 11 double asterisk, "All payments are due by Friday at 11:00 a.m.
- 12 Central time for the following week," so that would have made
- 13 it March 19th.
- On March 19th, they were required to pay -- and it's
- not \$2.3 million, Your Honor -- it's 2.795, so that's why I
- 16 said \$2.8 million. That's the 20 percent overage that you'll
- 17 see in the text messages that Mr. Jensen was not aware of, but
- he agreed is existing in the industry norm, so it's 2.8
- 19 million. There it is signed by Mr. Jensen on behalf of Maxim.
- So that is the amount of the payment that was due on
- 21 March 19th which, I was checking, is the Friday of the
- following week. And even if it's for the Friday of next week
- of March 26th, they still didn't make the payment, so the
- breach is either on March 19th or March 26th. Either way,
- 25 there's no evidence that any money was moved out of the trade

account before that date. In fact, the evidence is that this amount of money was not in the trade account because it was never paid.

Now what counsel is trying to suggest is that a text message where Miss Watson said we are good to go is a complete amendment to the contract and the pricing terms and the value terms. This is all, as counsel knows, there was never a reduction in the volume, no agreement to reduce the volume because to do so would have been sending the bad message to Valero that this party would not be able to continue to draw the same amount, so the parties agreed not to change the volume.

There's no term -- there's no written document changing the volume. Saying, Your Honor, saying that we are good to go is not a modification of a requirement to pay \$2.8 million. You just can't get there in a text message, we are good to go.

And as I showed the Court before, the contract in Section 21, which is a subsequent provision to what counsel showed you, says it must be in writing and signed by Noil Corp. There's no amendment to this contract. If counsel's trying to claim that the invoice is an amendment, well, the invoice shows that it's got to be 2.8 million due March 16th, Friday following. Never happened, never happened. That is the first breach, Your Honor, and there is no evidence whatsoever before

the Court that there was any movement of monies out of the trade account by Maxim on that date.

So in answer to the Court's question, first breach, no doubt about it, it was done by Maxim. And Maxim cannot enforce a contract that they previously breached, especially when the contract does not even have the provision that they're trying to enforce. There is no escrow agreement. Escrow is not in the invoice, it's not in the contract, there's no structure for an escrow agreement, there's no third party like you would have a bank or a trustee or somebody holding the money, there's no conditions. It's a trade account, Your Honor, that's what it is. It's not an escrow agreement.

And Miss Watson did call it an escrow in several places; that was a mistake by her to call it that. I can guarantee you she'll never call it that again, but there's no escrow agreement. And that is contrary to the terms, the express terms of the contract itself and the invoice because it shows what's going to happen to the monies.

So counsel's attempt to say that saying it's, you know, creating an escrow agreement out of thin air is simply supplementing or clarifying the contract terms, what counsel is trying to do is get around the parol evidence rule that I'm sure the Court is rather familiar with. It doesn't supplement or clarify; it changes.

If you want an escrow agreement, you know how to do

```
1
     an escrow agreement. People know how to do escrow agreements.
 2
     You do them all the time for the sale of houses, for the sale
 3
     of businesses, for holding funds like this. That's not the way
 4
     it was, Your Honor. And for them to seek a specific
 5
     performance injunction to create something that didn't exist,
 6
     it's contrary to Texas law.
 7
               It's also contrary to Texas law, Your Honor, for the
 8
     misrepresentation and we had no response to the consistent
 9
     Texas Supreme Court authority. There could be no justifiable
10
     reliance on an alleged misrepresentation concerning subject
     matter that's in a written contract, especially a written
11
12
     contract here, Your Honor, where it says this is the only
13
     agreement, any prior agreements are terminated and any changes
14
     to this agreement must be in writing and signed, and there's
     nothing else that's been in writing or signed.
15
16
               That's why we have contracts, Your Honor. We're not
17
     talking about, you know, two uneducated non-sophisticated
18
     people on a street corner shaking hands and then, you know,
19
     signing a post-it note. We're talking about sophisticated
20
     parties.
21
               THE COURT: Mr. Navarre, the breach of contract that
22
     you're talking about is represented in the invoice for 2.8
23
     million --
24
               MR. NAVARRE: Correct.
```

THE COURT: -- where only 2 million was paid,

```
1
     correct?
 2
               MR. NAVARRE: Correct. And it wasn't even timely
 3
     paid, Your Honor.
 4
               THE COURT: So that in essence makes it part of the
 5
     contract, doesn't it, the invoice?
 6
               MR. NAVARRE: I agree, Your Honor. I think the
 7
     invoice is part of the contract. And frankly, it's the only
 8
     place where they can point to where there's agreement as to the
 9
     trade account. And as counsel said, this is a master services
10
     agreement. We then have invoices on a continuing basis.
               THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ortiz.
11
12
               MR. NAVARRE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I just wanted
13
     to make sure I responded to the Court's question.
14
               THE COURT: You did and that's very helpful.
15
               MR. NAVARRE: Okay.
               THE COURT: Mr. Ortiz.
16
17
               MR. ORTIZ: Yes, a couple of things.
18
               Mr. Navarre, if you would stop sharing your screen,
19
     I'd appreciate it. Thank you.
20
               His claim that I have not responded to his arguments
21
     about the merger clause or, you know, no subsequent agreements
22
     because it wasn't reduced to writing. Again, the trade
23
     account, the terms of the trade account are clear. He says
24
     there's no conditions placed upon the trade account. Well,
25
     there are. I mean, if you just look at the trade account, the
```

provisions there, it says payment will be held by Noil in the trade account until the first lift has been confirmed as completed. That is a condition and that's a condition that was violated by the defendants.

Not only that, he mentioned the parol evidence rule. Well, there's an exception to the parol evidence rule, and that's when abused by fraud and that's exactly what we have in this case.

As to his argument that we waived -- I'm sorry -- that we breached the contract first. Clearly, they waived any possible breach when you have them constantly afterwards say, you know, March 17th, please let me know when the funds for the escrow trade account should be issued. So they're still trying to get the funds on March 17. Here, we have the text message where they said they'll be good to go once they have the entire 2 million; this is after March 17.

The wire was sent -- so the wire was sent on March 22nd; that's the \$1.5 million wire. After they have the \$1.5 million wire, they were saying, hey, send us that other 500,000; that way, we can, you know, get you the volume and get you access at the terminal.

So clearly as of March 22nd, which is after the date he said that we breached, they are -- they have waived that breach and are still trying to get that other \$500,000 from us. But they did not, you know, cry foul and say you breached the

agreement, you know, we want to terminate it, or complained at all. No.

To the contrary, they were doing anything they could to continue to try and get these funds and continue to reference these funds as escrow funds or your agreed escrow amount was not received until late last Friday; that was when the schedule was to be released. You know, Steve will send you what you need to lift. So clearly, to the extent that there was ever a claim that we breached some agreement, it was waived by them.

And contrary to Mr. Navarre's arguments, the provisions on the invoice regarding the trade account do have conditions and those conditions were violated.

MR. NAVARRE: Your Honor, no waiver is required to be in writing and signed also in Section 21. There's no waiver. We just were trying to -- we were trying to work things out, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. If there's nothing further, the Court has what it needs to rule on the preliminary injunction and will do so by noon on Monday. The expiration would be close of business Monday, but the Court should have a ruling out by noon Monday.

If there's anything that you referenced or you want the Court to make sure we have in the record, Mr. Ortiz, like those texts that you put up on the screen, if you would just

```
1
     supplement and just make sure those are in the record, then the
 2
     Court will make sure that they are.
 3
               MR. ORTIZ: Absolutely. Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
               THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything further, Mr.
 5
     Navarre?
 6
               MR. NAVARRE: No, Your Honor, just thank you again to
 7
     you and your staff.
 8
               THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Ortiz.
 9
               MR. ORTIZ: Yes. Thank you very much for your time
10
     and for hearing this on such an emergency basis.
11
               THE COURT: Very good.
12
               MR. ORTIZ: We appreciate it.
13
               THE COURT: Thank you all. We are in recess.
14
               MR. NAVARRE: Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Thank you.
15
16
          (Hearing adjourned at 2:14 PM)
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

$\texttt{C} \ \texttt{E} \ \texttt{R} \ \texttt{T} \ \texttt{I} \ \texttt{F} \ \texttt{I} \ \texttt{C} \ \texttt{A} \ \texttt{T} \ \texttt{I} \ \texttt{O} \ \texttt{N}$ I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Soneya M. Leslandi Hyd Sonya Ledanski Hyde Veritext Legal Solutions 330 Old Country Road Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 Date: October 12, 2021